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Abstract 
There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since 
various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we find it useful 
to study preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify two sets of appealing 
axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution. Thus bar­
gainers may be able to reach agreement on which solution to employ. Under the first set 
of axioms, the Nash solution is preferred to any other solution, while under the second 
set, a new solution, which we call the weighted linear solution, is best. 
Preferences over Solutions to the Bargaining 
Problem* 
Kim C. Bordert Uzi Segalt 
1 Introduction
In the Nash [7, 8) approach to bargaining, a bargaining game is described by a pair 
(S, d) where S c JR2 is compact and convex and d E S. Elements of S are interpreted
as vectors of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities of the two players. The point d is 
the disagreement point, that is, a vector of utilities that either player can unilaterally 
enforce. A solution is a function f that assigns to each game (S, d) a point in S. Of 
course many solutions are possible, but Nash proposed internal consistency conditions 
on the values of a solution across different games. The only solution to satisfy his axioms 
is called the Nash bargaining solution, and is defined by 
Other notions of consistency can be imposed on a solution.. Kalai and Smorodinsky [6), 
for example, offered another set of axioms, with another notion of internal consistency, 
and got a different solution. It is therefore natural to ask, given that different notions 
of consistency exist, which is a better solution. We assume that there exist preferences 
over solutions satisfying certain sets of axioms and explore whether they admit maximal 
elements, and if so, what they are. 
The assumptions we make on the preference order over solutions can be interpreted 
in more than one way. One interpretation is that the two bargainers hire an arbitrator to 
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make choices for them. 'The arbitrator will of course have a preference order over solutions 
that embodies his own notions of fairness, and the bargainers will have not necessarily 
be able to know in advance what those preferences are. Furthermore, both parties must 
agree to bind themselves to arbitration. We can interpret our axioms on preferences as 
properties that both bargainers can accept in an arbitrator, subject to the constraint that 
both must agree to hire one. For instance, while my coauthor's preference over solutions 
is simply to maximize his own payoff, and my preference is to maximize mine, we both 
know that neither will agree to impose such a requirement on an arbitrator. 
Another approach is to interpret the preference ordering as somehow representing 
the bargainers' actual preferences and values. In general,· aggregation of preferences is a 
problem because people usually have different preferences. However, when all relevant 
agents agree that a certain policy is the best, this problem becomes moot. So an alter­
native interpretation of our assumptions that each of the two players actually has such 
preferences. These two preference relations do not have to be the same, but it may nev­
ertheless happen that both players will agree that a certain solution is best. Under this 
interpretation, we must find grounds to justify an individual having such preferences. 
Since a player must choose a solution without any knowledge of what game(s) he 
will actually play or who his opponent will be, the choice of a solution is a decision 
problem under risk (or perhaps ignorance). On the other hand we also expect that a 
player's preferences will embody his notions of fairness. Thus we impose three kinds 
of conditions on preferences: conditions taken from the literature on decision making 
under risk (such as the independence axiom or mixture symmetry); conditions about 
fairness (such as our disagreement indifference and unevenness indifference axioms); and 
a monotonicity axiom, which just asserts that utility is a good thing. We also impose 
the technical condition of continuity in order to guarantee a utility representation of the 
preferences. 
We consider two sets of axioms on preferences, although many more are conceivable. 
The first set of axioms implies that the Nash solution is the best, and we give a full 
description of all preference relations satisfying this set. The second axiomatization 
implies another best solution, which we call the weighted linear solution, and here too 
we prove that it is the best element of all preference relations satisfying our axioms. We 
present these two models in Sections 2 and 3. We conclude with a further discussion of
the interpretation of our results and compare them to other models in the literature in 
Section 4. The theorems are proved in the appendices. 
2 The Nash Bargaining Solution
For our purposes, a two-person bargaining game is represented by a compact and convex 
subset S of JR� such that S is disposable, that is, [x E S and x � y] ::::} y E S. (We use
the following orders on vectors. x � y means Xi � Yi for all i and x � y means Xi > Yi
for all i). Each point x = (xi, x2 ) E S corresponds to a utility allocation for the two
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players in which player 1 ·receives x1 and player 2 receives x2• We assume throughout
that the disagreement point is (0, 0). 
Let g denote the set of all games that are included in (0, K] x (0, K] c JR! and contain
the point ( K, K). All we· require is that K > 0, but it may be as close to zero as one wishes.
A solution is a function f :  g --+ JR! satisfying f ( S) E S for every S E g. In this section
we assume that solutions are continuous in the Hausdorff metric, given by 
p(S,T) - max{ sup d(x, T), sup d(x, S)} 
xES 'xET. 
inf{c > 0: SC Ne(T) and TC Ne(S)},
where d(x, T) = infyET llx - Yll and Ne(T) = {x E JR! : d(x, T) < c }. The space Q of
games is compact in the Hausdorff metric.1 
Since games are convex and disposable, the outer boundary determines the distance 
between two games. If each point on the boundary of S is within c neighborhood of a 
boundary point of T and vice-versa, then the Hausdorff distance between S and T is no 
more than c, and conversely. 
A solution is continuous if it is a continuous function from g to JR!. Both Nash's (7] 
and Kalai-Smorodinsky's [6] solutions are continuous. Let :F denote the set of continuous 
solutions. Then :F is a metric space under the metric 
d(f, g) =sup ll f(S) - g(S)ll· 
SEQ 
This metric defines the topology of uniform convergence of solutions on Q, and :F is 
separable [1, Lemma 3.72]. 
Two solutions can be mixed as follows. For f, g E :F and a E [O, 1], the solution
af + (1 - a)g assigns game S E g the outcome af(S) + (1 - a)g(S). All games S are
assumed to be convex so this mixture is well defined. Since points in S are interpreted 
as vectors of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility levels, one can interpret the· solution 
af + (1 - a)g as a lottery that yields the solution f with probability a and the solution
g with probability 1 - a. This is because ex ante, each player's utility is the same under
the mixed solution and under the lottery. 
On :F we assume the existence of a quasiorder >;=, that is, >;= is reflexive, total, and 
transitive. Consider the following assumptions. 
C (Continuity) >;= is a closed subset of :F x :F. 
1This is because the space K of compact convex subsets of [O, KJ x [O, K] is a compact metric space
under the Hausdorff metric [1, Theorem 5.43], and it is straightforward to show that Q is a closed subset
of K. Incidentally, this is why we need the assumption that all games in Q contain the point (K., K.).
The set of games for which there only exists some strictly positive point is u-compact, but not compact, 
which creates problems later. 
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M (Monotonicity) If !(8) � g(8) for all 8 E g and f(T) � g(T) for some T, then
f 'r g.
DI (Disagreement Indifference) If for all 8 E Q, either fi(8) = 0 or !2(8) = 0 (or
both) , then f rv 0 (0 is the solution that gives both players always zero) .
MS (Mixture Symmetry) For each a E [O, 1],
f rv g implies af + (1 - a)g rv ag + (1 - a)f.2
The continuity assumption is on the preference relation >t:=, and is different from the 
assumption that each of the solutions is a continuous function. Regarding monotonicity, 
note that if f(T) � g(T), then continuity of solutions guarantees that f >> g on an open
set of games. Also note that condition DI does not require that it is always the same 
player who receives zero. This condition may be rationalized on the following grounds. A 
player does not know whether his opponent is going to abide by the solution in any given 
game 8. Clearly, the closer to zero his opponent's utility is (when better outcomes are 
possible) under a solution, the more likely his opponent is to deviate from the solution. 
This probability becomes a virtual certainty when his opponent's outcome is zero. This 
is because in that case his opponent has no incentive at all to play and may as well 
"punish" the first player. Thus any attempt to use a solution satisfying the hypotheses 
of condition DI is tantamount to using the zero solution. 
One might argue that under this interpretation, the set :F should not include solutions 
f =!= 0 such that for all 8, f1(8)f2(8) = 0. In that case, we could adopt the following
alternative version of DI: Let f E :F be such that for all 8, f(8) � 0 and let g: g � Ri 
be such that for all 8, g1(8)g2(8) = 0. Suppose further that gi � g such that for each 
8, gi(8) >> 0. Then for i ;::: i*, f >t= gi. The original formulation of DI is preferable,
as it is arguably easier to grasp. The DI condition may also be thought as a minimal 
fairness requirement, in that it requires some (even if highly unequal) positive division
of the gains from cooperation, at least in some games .. 
If we interpret the axioms as characteristics of the arbitrator that both bargainers 
can accept, then player i's true preferences over solutions need not satisfy DI. Rather, 
the axiom represents his consent to the fact that he cannot impose his preferences on his 
opponent. Delegating authority to an arbitrator requires both players to agree on some 
ground rules, which by their nature ought to treat both bargainers symmetrically. DI 
satisfies this requirement. 
The rationale for the MS condition is the same as the .one used in decision theory 
(recall that af + (1 - a)g is equivalent to the lottery that yields the solution f with
probability a and the solution g with probability 1 - a). This axiom claims that if 
f "' g, then randomizing over the two may matter. However, given two states of the 
2In [2], Chew, Epstein, and Segal refer to this property as strong mixture symmetry. However, they 
show that it is equivalent to what they called mixture symmetry, so we adopt this definition. 
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world with probabilities· a and 1 - a,  it makes no ilifference whether one obtains the 
solution f in ·one state of the world or another. The mixture symmetry axiom is a 
weaker version of the usual independence axiom in decision theory (see Section 3), so
any arguments in favour of independence also apply here. Mixture symmetry has the 
advantage that it allows for preferences that some choices be made according to chance 
(e.g., draft lotteries). However, it is also consistent with the betweenness assumption,
namely that f rv g => f rv a f  + (1 - a)g for all a E [O, l].
Theorem 1 If � satisfies conditions C, M, DI, and MS, then there is a measure µ on
g with full support {that is, every open set in g has a positive measure), such that the 
utility Junction 
V(f) = l fi(S)h(S) dµ(S) 
represents� on :F. 
That is, solutions in :F are ranked on a weighted average of the "Nash social welfare 
function, " w(x) = xix2• This result immediately implies the next theorem.
Theorem 2 If� satisfies conditions C, M, DI, and MS, then the Nash bargaining solu­
tion is the unique �-best solution in :F . 
The formal proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A, but we shall explain the roles of
the hypotheses here. In essence, we use a finite set Ti, ... , Tn of games to construct a
canonical preference relation on the subset Ti x ... x Tn of R�n. This preference relation is
continuous and satisfies mixture symmetry. In [2] it is shown that for convex subsets of a
finite dimensional space, any continuous preference order� satisfying mixture symmetry 
has a utility representation V of the following sort. The set may partitioned into three 
convex regions A, B and C, so that V is quadratic and quasiconcave on A, quadratic 
and quasi convex on C, and satisfies betweenness on B. Furthermore A � B � C. 
Disagreement indifference rules out regions B and C. The problem is to extend this finite 
dimensional result to the infinite dimensional space :F . The canonical preference relation 
we construct has a quadratic utility, which we use to construct a probability measure 
on g x g which is supported by the pairs (Ti, Tj)· We show that a unique limiting 
measure exists as n --+ oo. This allows us t-o show that· there is a ·utility function of 
the form V(f) = fgxg fi(S)f2(T) dµ (S, T). The assumption of disagreement indifference
guarantees that the support of the limit measure is on the diagonal of g x Q, which 
gives rise then to the representation in Theorem 1. The full support is guaranteed by the
monotonicity condition, which also figures in other subtle ways. The compactness of the 
space Q is crucial to showing that a limiting measure exists, which is one reason we assume 
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that ( K, K) belongs to all games. 3 . Of course, once we have the -utility representation, 
since the Nash bargaining solution maximizes the integrand at each point, it is the ·best 
solution. 
3 The Weighted Linear Solution
In this section we present a different set of assumptions about the preference relation 
>;=, and get another (unique) solution that is better than any other solution. Here too, 
players may have different preferences >;=i, but will nevertheless agree what solution is 
best. 
We assume in this section that all games S are strictly convex. That is, x, y E SnR�+
and x =f. y imply that for all a E (0, 1), ax + (1 -a)y E Int(S). We no longer have to
assume that ( K, K) E S, for all S E g, but we will assume that for all S, S n R�+ =f. 0.
Unlike the previous section, we assume here that a solution is any measurable (not 
necessarily continuous) function f: g --+ R2 , and the set :F is now the set of measurable
solutions. Also, we replace mixture symmetry by the stronger independence assumption. 
I (Independence) Fore every f, g, h E :F and every a E (0, 1],
f >;= g if and only if af + (1 -a) h >;= ag + (1 -a)h.
We use the following notation. For S E g, let 
and let 
The three conditions of monotonicity, disagreement indifference, and independence are 
inconsistent. To see why, observe that by condition I, f l'V g implies f l'V af + (1 - a)g 
for all a E [O, l]. For every S, let f(S) = (a1(S), 0) and let g(S) = (0, a2(S)). By DI,
f ,..._, g '"'"' 0, hence �! + �g ,..._, 0. However, by monotonicity, �! + �g >- 0. We therefore
replace condition DI by a weaker condition, which we call unevenness indifference. 
Disagreement indifference. assumes that.giYing .zero..t0-0ue.play,ex...is . .ba.d1 .&n<l moreover,
it does not matter who that player is. One possible rationale for this assumption is that if 
preferences over solutions reflect preferences for fairness, then solutions that always leave 
at least one player with nothing are worse than any other solution. Preferences over 
30therwise, it might turn out that the utility of a solution f is determined by limits of values of f(S) 
as S decreases to {(O, O)}. There are of course other assumptions that could be used to rule out this 
implausible sort of preference order, but we feel our choice is as good as any other. 
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such solutions are-insensitive to the allocation the-other player receives. The following 
assumption, which is weaker than disagreement indifference, assumes that the preference 
relation over solutions is sensitive to each player's payoff, even when the other player 
receives zero. 
U (Unevenness Indifference) For every S, let f*(S) = (a1(S), 0) and g*(S) = (0, a2(S)).
Then f* rv g*. Moreover, if f E :F is such that for all S E Q, either f (S) = 
(a1(S), 0), or f(S) = (0, a2(S)), then f � f*. 
The first part of this condition states indifference between person 1 and person 2 
being a dictator. The second part suggests that "mixed dictatorship, " in the sense that 
each person is a dictator only for some games, cannot be worse than pure dictatorship. 
Definition 1 The weighted linear solution W: Q -+ JR2 is given by
W(S) = argmax(xi.x2)esa2(S)x1 + a1(S)x2•
The weighted linear solution enjoys the following property. 
Theorem 3 Suppose that the preference relation � satisfies conditions C, M, I, and U.
Then the weighted linear solution is the �-best solution in :F. 
This theorem says that the best solution is obtained by maximizing a linear social 
welfare function. Such social welfare functions were first axiomatized by Harsanyi [5].4 
Our result differs from the standard linear function in two significant ways. First, the 
coefficients are not fixed, and vary from one game to another. Second, we offer a justifica­
tion of the different weights individuals' utilities receive. The weight of each individual is 
the maximal utility his opponent may receive. It suggests that society should pay higher 
consideration to the well being of its worse-off member. 
It is also interesting to compare the weighted linear solutions with the one offered by 
Kalai and Smorodinsky [6]. Using our notation, their solution is the function f E :F, given 
by f(S)= argmaxxesmin{a2(S)x1, a1(S)x2}. It is well known that the min{a1u1, a2u2}social welfare function is the extreme case of giving the weakest parts of society special 
consideration, whereas the additive function a1 u1 + a2u2 is the extreme opposite case, 
where no one gets special consideration because of his position. This is true, however, 
only if the cuefficients..�.are_fixed ... ln.our case, .since-the�nd.on . .tOO.-game S, we get 
the opposite results. The weighted linear solution gives more weight to the weaker of the 
two players (as measured by the maximal utility level they can achieve). The solution 
offered by Kalai and Smorodinsky does just the opposite, as it inflates the utility of the 
weaker player by multiplying it by the index of the other player. 
40bserve that the Nash solution can be viewed as maximizing a quadratic social welfare function 
(Epstein and Segal [4]). 
7 
4 Some Remarks on the Literature
Recently, Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson [9] analyzed the bargaining problem in light of 
the recent non-expected utility literature and presented an alternative model and axioms. 
They start with a certain set A of (physical) alternatives and a point D. Each of the two
players has preferences over lotteries over elements of A. Given the utility functions u1
and u2 of the two players, points in A, and the point D, are transformed into points in R2 • 
Formally, d(ui,u2;D) = (u1(D),u2(D)) and S(ui,u2;A) = {(u1(a),u2(a)): a EA}. The
authors point out that there are two possible interpretations of the bargaining model. 
According to the first, the set A and the point D are fixed, say A =A* and D = 
D*. The bargaining problem is to decide what point in S(u1, u2; A*) to choose for each
pair of utilities (ui, u2), given that the disagreement point is d(ui, u2; D*). If f is a
solution to that problem, then a physical outcome of the solution is a point a in A* 
such that (u1(a),u2(a)) = f(S(ui,u2;A*)). Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson use this
interpretation. Note that if u1 and u2 are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions,
then the invariance with respect to utility transformations axiom is almost trivial-the 
outcome (in A*) should depend on preferences, and not on the particular choice of a
utility function. 
In this paper we adopt an alternative approach which holds the players (with their
preferences and utility functions) fixed, and lets the set A vary (we assumed a fixed
point of disagreement) . Formally, let ui and u2 be two given von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions. What rule should be used to determine how much utility will each of 
the two players get for different sets A? This representation of the problem fits better 
into a social choice context. Note that Nash's axiom of invariance with respect to utility 
transformations does not fit into this interpretation, because it analyses rescaling of the 
utility functions, which in this approach are assumed to be fixed. (Nash's [7] axiom
requires that if S' is obtained from S by taking linear transformations of the two utility 
functions, then the value of the solution at S' should be obtained by taking the same 
linear transformation of the value of the solution at ·s). Rescaling utility functions is
possible in our approach, but leads to much weaker results. Suppose that instead of the 
utility function ui, player i uses the utility function aiui. Then for each set A we get a
new set of corresponding utility vectors. Formally, it defines an isomorphism g f-t Qa, 
where for S E Q, S f-t Sa = { (a1x1, a2x2) : (x1, x2) E S}. It is natural to require
that possible solutions will be transformed in the same way. Formally, :F f-t :Fa, where 
fa(Sa) = (aif1(S), ad2(S)). Unlike Nash's axiom, this is a transformation of solutions
(which are functions), and not values of a given solution for different games. All it says
is that the choice of points out of the (different) sets A should depend on the players'
preferences, and not on the chosen utility functions. A similar argument also implies 
that one should not assume symmetry. A symmetric set S depends on a specific choice 
of utility functions by the players and does not necessarily represent a true symmetric 
situation (see also [9]).
In this paper we assume that players have preferences over all possible solution con-
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cepts. A similar idea is employed ·by van Damme [10]. In his model players can choose 
a solution concept, and then bargain with their opponent, provided they adhere to their 
(perhaps different) solutions. Making some restrictions on the set of solutions players
may adopt, he proves that Nash solution constitutes the unique equilibrium of the game 
induced by this procedure. In his approach, the Nash solution is the outcome of strategic 
behavior, and not necessarily the players' preferred solution. We are interested in the 
players' preferred solution, and we axiomatize preferences leading to agreement between 
players about such an optimal solution. 
One motivation for this paper is the fact that both Nash's and Kalai-Smorodinsky's 
have a lot of appeal. Unfortunately, the two systems of axioms leading to these solutions 
are inconsistent. It is therefore natural to have preferences over such systems, and there­
fore over solutions. One might argue, however, that we replaced systems of axioms about 
solutions by systems of axioms on preferences over solutions. And since two such systems 
are presented above, we may once again face the same problem, namely, which one do we 
prefer. This objection is faulty. Nash and Kalai and Smorodinsky axiomatize the notion 
of consistency of a solution. Clearly, both offer reasonable definitions of consistency, and 
players may like both. We, on the other hand, axiomatize individual preferences over 
solutions. Standard models of consumer theory argue that each agent has one preference 
relation which is part of his characteristics, and is not an element of choice. Players may 
therefore prefer the axioms of Nash to those of Kalai-Smorodinsky, but it is meaningless 
for a player to prefer the axioms of Section 2 to those of Section 3.
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Appendix A: Proof.of Theorem 1 
The proof of Theorem 1 is divided into numerous lemmas. Given T E g, for S E g define
aT(S) = max{A : AT C S}. That is, aT(S)T is the largest multiple of T that fits in
S. In particular, aT(T) = 1. Also note that if S, T E Q, then ; � aT(S) � �. The
mapping SH aT(S) is continuous for any T. 
We now temporarily fix T and for each x ET we construct a solution <I>T,x by 
<I>T,:x(S) = aT(S)x. 
By definition, aT(S)x E S, so <I>T,x is truly a solution. Furthermore, observe that 
<I>T,x(T) = x. 
Lemma 1 For every S, T E Q and for every x E T, the solution <I>T,x satisfies,
K 
llx - <I>T x(S)ll � 4-p(S, T).' K, (1) 
The proof of this lemma is a tedious exercise in elementary geometry, so we defer it 
to Appendix C. 
The above construction induces an isomorphism between T and a subset of solutions. 
Lemma 2 The isomorphism x H <I>T,z from T into :F is continuous and one-to-one. It
preserves mixtures in the sense that <I>T,>.x+(I->.)v = A<l>T,x + (1-A)<I>T,y, and is monotonic
(that is, if x » y, then <I>T,:x(S) » <I>T,y(S) for all S). Finally, if xi = 0, then <I>T,x gives
player i the outcome 0 for all S. 
Proof Continuity follows from continuity of aT(S). Mixture preservation follows from 
(A<l>T,x + (1 - >i)<I>T,y)(S)
The other claims.are-0bvious. 
A<l>T,x(S) + (1 - >i)<I>T,y(S) 
AaT(S)x + (1 - >i)aT(S)y
aT(S)(>ix + (1 - >i)y)
<I>T,>.x+(i->.)y ( S). 
•
Our aim is to approximate arbitrary solutions by convex combinations of solutions of 
this form. In order to do this, we need a partition of unity with some special properties. So 
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given n, let Qn = {z E JR+ : at most one Zi = O}, and define )..n = (>.�, ... , >.:): Qn -t R+
by 
-
! �:
i n -n if each Zj > 0\n( · ) L.J·-1 Z · "i zi, . . . ' Zn = 1 
J ' 
"f 0 1 Zi = 
0 if Zj = 0 for some j =f. i. 
Observe that ,\n is continuous on Qn and is a partition of unity, that is, E�=l >.f(z) = 1
for each z E Qn.
We now define the convex combinations. Given a vector T of distinct games T =
(Ti, . . . , Tn) and a vector x of points x = (xi, .. . , Xn) with xi E Ti for each i , define the
solution cI>T,x by 
n 
cI>T,x(S) = L >..f(p(S, Ti), · ••, p(S, Tn))cI>T;,a)S). 
i=l 
Observe that cI>T,x is continuous, cI>T,x(S) E S for each S, and cI>T,x(S) = Xi whenever 
S =Ti. 
Our next claim is that solutions of this form are dense in :F. For this, fix a countable 
dense subset {T1, T2, ••• } of Q. Let f be a fixed solution and define the solution
cl>� = cpT1, . . ,Tn;/(T1), ... ,/(Tn)• 
Observe that by construction, cI>�(Ti) = f (Ti), i = 1, ... , n.
Lemma 3 For each f E :F, cI>� n-.oo f uniformly on Q.
Proof Since f is continuous and g is compact, f is uniformly continuous on g. Therefore 
for each c > 0, there is some 8(c) > 0 such that p(S, T) < 8(c) implies ll f(S)-f(T)ll < c.
To simplify notation, suppress the f and just write cI>n. Now let c > 0 be given. Set 
'TJ = min{1;Kc, 8(�)}. Choose N0 large enough so that for n � N0, for every T E  Q, there
is some Ti E {T1, .. .  , Tn} with p(T, Ti) < �. (This can be done since {T1 , T2, ••• } is dense.)
Choose N1 large enough so that for n � N1, 2� ./2K < �'and set N = max{N0, Ni}.
Choose an arbitrary S E Q. Then recalling that E�=l >..f = 1 , we get
llJ(S) - cI>n(S)ll 
n 
- = · ·  llf(S)-· E-A[(,o(S, Ti),. ;,-,p(S,±'nJ�;,J(T;#')IJ 
i=l 
n 
- llL >..f (p(S, Ti), ... , p(S, Tn))(f(S) - cI>T;,/(T;)(S))ll
i=l 
n 
� L >..f(p(S, Ti), · · ·, p(S, Tn))llJ(S) - cI>T;,f(T;)(S)ll
i=l 
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(2) 
Now 
llJ(S) - <I>T;,f(T;)(S)ll � II! (S) - !(71)11+11!(71) - <I>T;,f(T;)(B)ll· (3) 
So break up the sum in (2) into two parts. Let A= {i: p(S, 11) < 77} and B =Ac. Then
for i EA, equation (3). implies 
c c 
ll f(S) - <I>T;,f(T;)(S)ll � 3 + 3· 
This is because the first term on the right hand side of (3) is less than or equal to � by
the definition of 8(c), and the second term comes from Lemma 1. Also observe that there
is some i* E A with p(S, 11·) < �· Regarding the terms in B, since S E Q is bounded
above by (K, K), the distance llJ(S) - <I>T;,f(T;)(S)ll is bounded above by ./2K, which is
independent of S. Then using the definition of >.n in (2), we have
llJ(S) - <I>n(S)ll n 
� L >.1/(p(S, Ti),···, p(S, Tn))llJ(S) - <I>T;,f(T;)(S)ll 
i=i 
•
We next define an ordering �n on Ti x T2 • • • x Tn, where Ti, ... , Tn are the first n 
elements of the fixed dense set {Ti, T2, • • •  }, by
It follows from . .Lemma-2 that..the. relati0n. �n Gn-T1 :x�  � ·--X Tfi .fs"'R· monotonic convex
continuous quasiorder, and satisfies mixture symmetry. 
In the sequel we say that the function W of n variables is quadratic if it is of the form 
n n n 
W(xi, . .. , Xn) = L L  aijXiXj + L bixi + c 
i=i j=i i=i 
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Lemma 4 The preference tn is represented by a utility function of the form
n n 
Vn (x) = L L(Xi1X;2)Pij, 
where p � 0 and E�j=I Pij = l.
i=l j=l 
Proof. It follows from arguments in [2, 3], that tn has a continuous utility Vn on T1 x · · · x 
T n, which can be partitioned into three convex regions A, B and C, so that Vis quadratic 
and quasiconcave on A, quadratic and quasiconvex on C; and satisfies betweenness on 
B. Furthermore A tn B tn C. We will rule out areas B and C by showing that 
the coordinate axes are indifference sets, which is compatible only with a quasiconcave 
quadratic representation. 
Let xi E T1 x T2 • • • x Tn satisfy xm2 = 0 for all m = 1, . . . , n ,  Xm1 = 0 for all m-/= i, 
and Xi! = max{x1 : x E Ti} � K > 0. It follows that <PT,x•(Sh = 0 for all S. So by
condition DI, <PT,x' ,...., <PT,o, which implies that the il-axis is a tn-indifference set. This
shows that every axis is an indifference set, which rules out the regions B and C. 
Thus tn has a representation of the form 
n n 2 2 n 2 
Vn(x) = L L L L(XikXjt)Pikjt+ L LXikbik, 
i=l j=l k=l l=l i=l k=l 
(4) 
where p satisfies p � 0 (because of monotonicity) and I:i I:j :Ek Et Pikjl = 1. (The
sum cannot be zero, since Vn is not linear). We now show that the bik terms in the
representation in equation (4) are zero. Let xi be as above. Then by condition DI,
<PT,xi ,...., <PT,o, so Vn(xi) = 0, for all values of Xil· This implies Pili! = bi1 = 0. Similar
arguments show that each Pjkjk = bjk = 0.
Next we show that if i i= j and k = £, then Pikjl = 0. Let xij E T1 x T2.• • • x Tn
satisfy x�2 = 0 form = 1, ... , n, x�1 = 0 form rJ. {i, j}, x�1 = max{x1 : x E Tm}
for m E { i, j}. Again <PT,xii (8)2 = 0 for all S, so as above Vn(xij) = O, which implies
Piljl = 0. Similarly each Pi2j2 = 0. •
This construction defines a discrete probability measure 7rn on Q xg by 7rn( {(Ti, Tj)}) = 
Pij for each (i, j). This measure has the property that 
for i = 1, ... , n and k = 1, 2. So abuse notation slightly and define Vn: :F -t JR by
13 
and note that Vn(J) = Vn(q>!). This means that 
Since g is compact, the set of probability measures on g x g is compact (in the
topology of weak convergence of measures [1, Theorem 12.10]), so there is a subsequence 
of 7r n converging to a limit 7r, which is also a probability measure on g x g. Define
V(J) = f Ji (S)J; (T). d7r(S, T).}gxQ . 
Note that if fm--+ f uniformly, then J fmifm2 d7rnm --+ J fih d7r, see [1, Corollary 12.6].
That is, VnmUm)--+ V(J). In particular, Vnm(q>!J--+ V(J). 
Lemma 5 If f );:= g, then V(J) � V(g). In particular, f l'V g implies V(J) = V(g).
Proof First suppose f >- g. Since q>� --+ f and q>h --+ g, for large enough n we have
q>� >- q>h, so Vn(q>�) > Vn(q>h)· Therefore V(J) � V(g). By continuity of V and );:=, we
have f );:= g implies V(J) � V (g) . •
Lemma 6 The limit measure 7r is supported by the diagonal .6. = { (S, S) : S E Q} of
g x g, 
Proof Let G x H cg x g be an open region with .6. n (G x H) = 0 and 7r(G x H) > 0.
Note that this implies that G n H = 0. Pick (S, T) E G x H. Let ,\: g --+ JR be a
continuous function satisfying ,\(S) = 1, 1 > ,\ (U) > 0 for all U E G with U =J S
and ,\(U) = 0 for all U E cc. Similarly let a: g--+ JR be a continuous function satisfying 
a (T) = 1, 1 > a (U) > 0 for all U E H with U =J '!'and a (U) = 0 for all U E He: Leth be
the solution that gives everything to 1, that is h1(U) = max{x1 : x EU} and h2 (S) = 0
for all S. Similarly let g give everything to 2. Set f (U) = ,\ (U)h (U) + a (U)g(U) . Then 
f is a continuous solution with { (S, T) : fi (S)h(T) > O} = G x H. But by condition
DI, f ,...., 0, so by Lemma 5, V(J) = V(O) = 0. Thus 7r (G x H) = 0. This implies
7r(.6.) = 1. •
Set µ (  G) = 7r( G x G) for every Borel subset G of Q� _Then .clearly 
V(J) = 1 fi (S)h(S) dµ (S).
Lemma 7 The measure µ has full support.
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Proof. Let G be an open subset of 9. Let N denote the Nash bargaining solution (any 
positive solution will do), and let .A: G --+ JR be a continuous function satisfying 1 � 
.A(S) > 0 for S E G and .A(S) = 0 for S E Ge. Let g be the solution defined by 
g(S) = .A(S)N(S). Then by monotonicity, g >- 0. Thus for some c > 0 small enough the
solution f with fk(S)....:.. c � K, k = 1, 2 is a solution on 9 satisfying g >- f. Therefore by
Lemma 5, V(9) � V(f). Now Vn(f) --+ V(f), and Vn(f) = c
2 for all n, so V(9) � c2 > 0,
which implies µ (  G) > 0. Thus µ has full support. •
We can now finally prove Theorem 1. 
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 1] We already know that f >;= 9 implies V(f) � V(9). It only 
remains to show that f >- 9 implies V(f) > V(g). Now if f >- g, it follows by condition
DI that fi(S)h(S) > 0 for some S. (Otherwise f ,.,_, 0.) Also, for some 1 > a � 0,
we have af rv 9. But since µ has full support, we get V(f) > V(af) � V(9), so
V(f) > V(9). •
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 3 
Lemma 8 Let 91, Q2 C Q be such that 92 = 9\91. Let f1, 91, J2, 9
2 E :F such that on 
911 J
i = 9i, i = 1, 2, and on 92, j1 = j2 and 91 = 92. Then j1 >;= j2 {::::::::} 91 >;= 92.
Proof. For every S, !f1 + !92 = !f2 + !91. By condition I, j1 >;= j2 iff !f1 + !91 >;=
!f2 + !91 =�fl+ !92 iff gl >;= 92. •
Lemma 9 Let f* and 9* be as in condition U, let Q1, Q2 be as in Lemma 8, and let f E :F
such that on Qi, f = J* and on Q2, f = 9*. Then j1 rv f*.
Proof. Define f1 = f*, 92 = g*, and 91 = f. Also, let j2 = 9* on 91 and j2 = f* on 92.By Lemma 8, f* >;= j2 {::::::::} J >;= g*. By condition U, j2, f >;= f* ,.,_, 9*. Hence f ,.,_, f*. • 
For S E Q and x E S, let L be the line through (0, 0) and x and let M be the
chord [(a1(S), 0), (0, a2(S))]. Denote the intersection point of these two lines d. Denote
the length of the chord [a, b] by B[a, b] and define a -. ..a{x,8) .. -..fi.{(D�.D},xJ/B[(O, 0), d],
(3 = {J(x, S) = B[(O, a2 (S)), d]/B[M]. Clearly, a E [O, 2] and (3 E [O, 1]. In the sequel, for
a E JR, [a] denotes the largest integer not bigger than a.
For x E S, define (x)n and (d)n by 
1. (d)n is in M, and satisfies B[(O, a2(S)), (d)n]/B[M] = [nfJ(x, S)]/n.
15 
2. (x)n is on the line through (0,0) and (d)n, and satisfies 8[(0,0), (x)n]/8[(0, 0), (d)n] =
[na(x, S)J/n.
Of course, (x)n is not necessarily in S. Define :Fn to be the set of solutions in :F suchthat for every SEQ, (f(S))n E S. Observe that :Fn C :Fk·n for k= 1, ... .
Define a function cpn: :Fn--+ :Fn by cpn(f)(S) = (f (S))n. Denote (f)n = cpn(f).
Definition 2 The two solutions f, g E :F are said to be equivalent to each other if for
every SEQ, a2(S)fi(S)+a1(S)f2(S) = a2(S)g1(S)+a1(S)g2(S). This relation is denoted
flg. 
Fact 1 Let f,g E :Fn. If flg, then (f)nI (g)n.
Fact 2 Let f E :Fn. Then (J)k·n k�oo f.
Lemma 10 Let Qi, Q2 C Q such that Q2 = Q\Q1 and let f, g E :F such that on Qi,
J = g, for S, S' E Q2, a* := a(f (S), S) = a(f(S'), S') = a(g(S), S) = a(g(S'), S'), 
/3i := /3(/(S), S) = /3(/(S'), S') and /32 := f3(g(S), S) = f3(g(S'), S'). Then J ""g. 
Proof. Suppose first that a* .:::;; 1. By Lemma 9, f* "" g, where g = f* on Qli and g = g* on 
Q2• By condition I, J1 := /3if*+(l-/3i)9 ""g1 := /32!*+(1-/32)9. As before, let 0 be the
zero solution. Again by condition I, f2 :=a* J1 + (1- a*)O ""g2 := a*g1 + (1-a*)O. On
Q2, f2 = f and g2 = g. (Clearly, if a(f (S), S) = a(g(S), S), and /3(/(S), S) = f3(g(S), S),
then f(S) = g(S)). Also, on Q1, f2 = g2• Therefore, by Lemma 8, f ""g.
Suppose now that a* > 1. Note that on 91, J1 = g1. Let /3, g3 = a* f* + (1 - a*)O
on Qi, and on Q2, let J3 = J1 and g3 = g1• By Lemma 8, J3 "" g3• Also, let /4 = g4 = f*
on 91, and on 92, let /4 = f and g4 = g. Now J3 = (l/a*)f4 + [1 - (1/a*)]O, while
g3 = (l/a*)g4 + [1 -(1/a*)]O, hence /4 ""g4• Again by Lemma 8, f ""g. •
Proof let 
• 9l = {S: a((f)n(S),S) = a((g)n(S),S) = i/n}, i = 0, ... ,2n
• QJ = {S: /3((f)n(S), S) = j/n}, j = 0, ... ,n
• Q2 = {S : /3((g)n(S),S) = k/n}, k = O, ... ,n
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Let m• = (2n + l)(n + 1)2• Form = 1, ... ,m•, let gm= gf n gjn gz, where m = 
i (n+1)2+ j(n+l)+k+l. {)f course, for some m, gm may be empty. Form= 0, ... ,m•, 
define fm =gm= 0 on Ui>mgi, and on Ui�mgi, fm = (J)n and gm= {g)n. Note that
fm• = {f)n and gm• =·(g)n. We prove by induction that for all m = 0, ... ,m•, fm "'gm.
The claim is trivially true form= 0. Suppose it holds form, and prove form+ 1. 
Define a solution h such that on Ui�m+lgi, h = Jm+l, and on gm+l, h = gm+l. By
Lemma 10, h ,....., Jm+l. Also, it follows by Lemma 8 and the induction hypothesis that
h "' gm+l. Therefore, Jm+l ,....., gm+l. •
Suppose f Jg. By Fact 1, (!)k·nJ{g)k·n, therefore (J)k·n "' (g)k·n. Note also that
:Fn -+ :F. By Fact 2 and the continuity of t, it follows that f "' g. Theorem 3 nowfollows from condition M. 
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 1 
We start with some simple facts. 
Fact 3 If ar(S) < 1, then ar(S n T) = ar(S).
Fact 4 p(S n T, T)::;:; p(S, T).
Proof We have to show that for x E T, d(x, Sn T) ::;:; d(x, S). Let x E T\S and 
y E S such that d(x, S) = d(x, y). If y E Sn T, then d(x, Sn T) = d(x, S). Suppose 
y E S\T. Then since S is disposable, and by the triangle inequality, d(x, S) < d(x, y), a
contradiction. •
We now turn to the proof of the Lemma t. We break the analysis into cases. For 
each of these cases we show that equation (1) is satisfied. 
Case 1: We consider first games S and T with ar(S) < 1. Let x* E T be such that
llx-<I>r,x(S)ll = (1-ar(S))llxll is maximized over T at x*. Note that x* E argmaxxerllxll
and that x* is on the boundary of T. We shall replace S and T by sets S* and T* satisfying
the following three requirements. 
1. x* ET*.
2. ar• (S*) = ar(S).
3. p(S*,T*)::;:; p(S,T).
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To simplify notation, replace aT(S) by simply a. Also, for x, y E JR2, let .e(x, y) denote
the line through these two points. The slope of a line His denoted u(H). 
By Facts 3 and 4, the three requirements are satisfied if T* = T and S* = Sn T. We
can thus assume that S C T. By the definition of aT(S), there is a point y E T such
that ay is on the outer boundary of S. Of course, y is on the boundary of T. Assume 
without loss of generality that Y1 � xi and Y2 � x2. 
Let H be a supporting line to S at ay. Denote the area bounded by Hand the two 
axes by Si, and let 82 = T n 81. Note that aT(S2) =a, but p(S2, T) � p(S, T). 
Let T* be the minimal convex disposable set containing y, x*, and ( "'' "'), and let 
S* = S2nT*. Clearly, aT·(S*) =a, but p(S*, T*) � p(S, T). Observe that for all x on the
boundary of T*, d(x, S*) � d(y, S*). This is because ax* E S*, hence u(H) � u(f(y, x*)).
On the other hand, the boundary of T* to the left of y is either the horizontal segment 
A= [ (O, y2), y] (y2 � "'), or it is the two segments B = [(O, "'), ("', "')] and C = [ ("', "'), y]. 
In the first case, no point in A can be further away from H than y. In the second case, 
since ("', "') E S*, it follows that B C S*, and since u(H) � u(f(("', "'), ay)), it follows
that y = argmaxxEcd(x, H). We thus obtain 
p(S*, T*) = d(y, S*) (5) 
There are now four subcases. 
Subcase 1. a: Suppose first that a(H) < -1 and y1 � "'· Now a(f(y, x*)) � a(H) < -1, 
so given that x* E argmaxxET· llxll it follows that y lies in the region bounded by the 
quarter circle of radius llx*ll and the line of slope -1 through x*. This line intersects this
arc in exactly two places: x* and its transpose (x2, xi) (which may coincide, in which case 
xi = x2 and y = x*). In particular, xi � x2 and since y lies to the right of the transpose 
(x2, xi), we have y1 � x;. It also follows that d(y, S*) � (1-a)y1, so by equation (5) we 
have (1 -a)y1 � p(S*, T*). Using y1 � "'' and these other facts we get
llx* -il>T,x• (S)ll - (1 -a)llx*ll
� (1 - a)ll(K, x;)ll
� (1 - a)ll(Yi, K)ll
� 11(1, K/y1)llp(S*, T*)
� II (1, KI"') llp(S*' T*)
K � -12,�p(S, T). "' 
Subcase 1. b: Suppose now that a( H) < -1 and y1 < "'· Since y is on the boundary of 
T*, Y2 � K. Observe that llx*ll � llYll· Let s2 = xi2 +x22 = llxll 2, and obtain
a(H) � a(f(y, x*)) � a(f(s/-/2, s/-/2), (s, 0)) = -../21
2-1 
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Let H* be the line through ay with slope -1 / ( v'2 - 1). Then, since u( H) < -1,
d(y, S*) � d(y, H*) = 
(1 - a)(Y1 + ( ../2 - l)y2) � (1 - a)( ../2 -l) K. J4-2J2 J4-2v'2 
In this calculation, we use the fact that the distance between the line Ax1 + Bx2 + C = 0
and the point (x�, xg) is 
Now 
l(Ax� + Bxg + C)I 
,./ A2 + B2 
llx* - <I>T,x•(S)ll - (1 - a)llx*ll
� (1- a)../2K 
� ../2KJ4-2J2 (ST)
(../2-l) K 
p 
' 
K < 4-p(S,T)K 
The last inequality follows from 
J2J4-20 - ../2(../2+1)\/4-2../2(v'2 - 1) 
- Js+4../2 < 4 
(6) 
Subcase 1. c: Suppose now that a(H) ;;:;: -1 and y2 ;;:;: K. Since a(H) ;;:;: -1, we have
d(y, S*) ;;:;: (1 - a)y2. Since y2 ;;:;: K, we have
llx* - <I>T,x• (S) II - (1 - a)llx*ll
� (1 - a)ll(K, Y2)ll
� p(S*, T*)ll(K/y2, 1) 11 
� p(S*, T*)ll(K/11:, 1)11 
K� ../2-p(S, T). 
K 
Subcase 1.d: The remaining case is 0-(H);;:;: -1 and y2 < 11:.-L-et-H* = f((11:, 11:), ay). Since
(11:, 11:) E S*, a(H*) ;;:;: a(H). Therefore, p(S, T) ;;:;: d(y, S*) ;;:;: d(y, H) ;;:;: d(y, H*). Note
that H* is given by -(ay2 - 11:)x1 + (ay1 - 11:)x 2 - a11:(y1 - y2) = 0. Therefore, by using
equation (6), we obtain 
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Hence 
llx• - 4>T,x•(S)ll - (1- a)llx•ll
� (1- a)v'2K 
� y'(ay1 - K)2 + (ay2 - K)2 v'2Kp(S, T) (7) K( Y1 - Y2) 
Since ay is on the boundary of S, it follows that a � K/y1. Also, by assumption,
a � L Since h(a) := (ay1 - K)2 + (ay2 - K)2 is a convex function of a, it follows that
for a E [ K/yi, 1], h(a) � max{h(K/y1), h(l)}. For a= K/yi, we obtain
Now let a= 1. Since y1 � Kand y2 :::::; a, we obtain for y =/= (K, K) that
_y_(_Y 1 _- K ) _2 _+_( _Y2 _-_K )_
2 � _! 
K( Y1 - Y2) -.;;: /'i, 
Thus inequality (7) becomes 
llx* - 4>T,x•(S)ll :::::; 
y'(ay1 - K)2 + (ay2 - K)2 v'2Kp(S, T)K( Y1 - Y2) 
:::::; v'2K p(S, T)K 
Finally, if y = (K, K) , then since ay is on the boundary of S, a= 1, and the lemma
is trivially true. 
Case 2: The analysis of the case aT(S) > 1 is similar, only we replace T with by S*, and
S by T*. •
20 
References 
[1] Aliprantis, C. D. and K. C. Border. 1994. Infinite dimensional analysis. Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag. 
[2] Chew, S. H., L. Epstein, and U. Segal. 1991. Mixture symmetry and quadratic utility. 
Econometrica 59: 139-163. 
[3] Chew, S. H., L. Epstein, and U. Segal. 1994. The projective independence axiom. 
Economic Theory 4:189-215. 
[4] Epstein, L. G. and U. Segal. 1992. Quadratic social welfare functions. Journal of
Political Economy 100:691-712. 
[5] Harsanyi, J. C. 1955. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal com­
parisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy 63:309-321. 
[6] Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky. 1975. Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem. 
Econometrica 43:513-518. 
[7] Nash, J. F. 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18:155-162.
[8] Nash, J. F. 1953. Two person cooperative games. Econometrica 21:128-140.
[9] Rubinstein, A., Z. Safra, and W. Thomson. 1992. On the interpretation of the Nash
bargaining solution and its extension to non-expected utility preferences. Economet­
rica 60:1171-1186. 
[10] van Damme, E. 1986. The Nash bargaining solution is optimal. Journal of Economic
Theory 38:78-100. 
21 
